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INTRODUCTION

Both Brazil and the United States are important participants in the oil
and gas industries. While the latter has a long history as a major player in this
sector, Brazil is aiming for the top. Thus, it is likely that both countries will
continue to have crucial roles in this disputed field. Nonetheless, Brazil and the
United States have important differences and similarities in their legal
frameworks and structural approaches to the exploration and production of oil
and gas.
In an attempt to understand how these two countries compare in their
legal frameworks, this Article offers a comparative analysis of the oil and gas
exploration and production regimes in Brazil and the United States, including
how they deal with the question of strategic ownership of hydrocarbons and the
dichotomy between national and international oil companies. The Article
explores the contrast between private and public ownership of hydrocarbons,
their determinants, and consequences. This discussion is closely related to the
role played by oil companies-whether public or private-and the tension
between profitability and public policy goals.
Part II offers estimates of production and reserves for each country, and
it provides an overview of both the Brazilian dual regime and the American
leasing system. It explains the basics of how Brazil's concession and
production sharing agreement regimes work, and it describes the United
States's leasing rules and regulations. It also describes the grating of oil and gas
exploration and production rights and the role of the regulatory agencies in
each country. Following this initial outline, Part III analyzes in more detail
some specific differences between Brazil and the United States: first, the issue
of in situ hydrocarbon ownership, comparing public ownership in Brazil versus
private ownership in the United States; second, the pros and cons arising from
the use of a national oil company, or an international oil company, as the main
vehicle to promote hydrocarbons development. Part IV concludes with a final
discussion of selected contrasts to recognize that each approach-with its
upsides and downsides-seems to fit the historical context and legal
environment of each country with no clear "better model."
II. OVERVIEW OF BRAZILIAN AND AMERICAN REGIMES

This Part provides an overview of production and reserves metrics for
both Brazil and the United States as well as a description of the regulatory
regimes of each country, including the regulatory structure and the role of the
agencies.
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Brazilian Dual Regime: Concession and ProductionSharing
Agreement

1.

Overview

The Brazilian Federal Constitution, enacted in 1988, provided that all
national oil and natural gas reserves were public property and belonged to the
Federal Government.' The Union held a natural monopoly over research,
exploration, production, refinement, transportation, importation, and
exportation of oil and its by-products.2 Petrobras S.A. ("Petrobras"), the
Brazilian National Oil Company ("NOC"),3 was the sole agent to explore the
Union's monopoly. In 1995, the Brazilian government reformed the oil and gas
regulatory framework. The Constitution was amended to authorize the Union
to contract with any company incorporated and headquartered in Brazil to
conduct the activities previously reserved only to Petrobras. It ended the oil and
gas public monopoly in Brazil.
In 1997, Congress enacted the Oil Act,5 establishing the new regulatory
framework and allowing competition in all segments of the oil and gas sector.
The Oil Act also created the regulatory agency responsible to oversee the oil,
gas, and biofuel activities, the National Petroleum Agency ("NPA"), 6 and the
National Energy Policy Council ("NEPC") responsible for national energy
public policy development. Among other tasks, the NPA is responsible for
preparing the tender announcements and running the bidding processes for
awarding exploration, development and production concessions, signing the
agreements deriving therefrom, and overseeing their implementation.8 These
duties are described in detail in Part II.A.3.

I
Brazil is a federation divided into states. However, unlike the United States, the Union is a
much stronger entity than the individual states because most legislation is enacted at the federal
level and applicable to all states. Therefore, in Brazil, the states have no specific oil and gas
exploration and production laws as these activities are regulated exclusively by the Union. See
also CONSTITUIQAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 177 (Braz.), available at
http://bd.camara.gov.br/bd/bitstream/handle/bdcamara/1344/constituicao-ingles 3ed.pdf.
2
In fact, the public monopoly dates back to 1953 when Federal Act 2004/1953 established
government control over oil and gas and incorporated Petrobras. Lei No. 2004, de 3 de Outubro
de 1953, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 3.10.1953 (Braz.) (revoked), available at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L2004.htm.
See infra Part II.A.3.a.
4

CONSTITUIWAO

FEDERAL

[C.F.]

[CONSTITUTION]

amend.

9

(Braz.),

available at

http://bd.camara.gov.br/bd/bitstream/handle/bdcamara/1344/constituicao-ingles_3ed.pdf.
5 Lei No. 9,478, de 6 de Agosto de 1997, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 7.8.1997
(Braz.), availableat http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/19478.htm.
6
See id. art. 7.
See id. art. 2.
8 Id. art. 8, § IV.
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Ever since the end of the monopoly era, Brazil's oil and gas industry
has steadily grown. 9 In late 2006, Petrobras announced it had found evidence of
ultra deep-water oil reserves beneath the underground salt layer ("pre-salt").'o
The pre-salt layer extends along the Brazilian outer continental shelf at about
186 miles from the shoreline. The oil in the pre-salt is of good quality and is
nestled in reservoirs at depths of 3.1 to 4.3 miles from the ocean surface,
underneath a salt layer that may range from 656 to 6.561 feet, as shown in the
tables below.

vcao

-3,00

to

004

000

Figure 1
Image Courtesy of World Oil Online"
The prospect of large reserves of oil in the pre-saltl2 with low
exploratory risks (Petrobras' success rate in the pre-salt drilled wells was about
87%)13 raised discussion of whether concessions are the appropriate legal
regime to govern the development of oil and gas in these locations. As a result,
a new regulatory framework was designed to govern the exploration and

1o

9For details on production rate and proven reserves see infra Part II.A.2.
Petrobras Anuncia Descoberta do Prd Sal, BRASIL.GOV.BR,

available

at

http://www.brasil.gov.br/linhadotempo/epocas/2006/petrobras-anuncia-descoberta-do-pre-sal.
Peter Howard Wertheim & Dayse Abrantes, South American Oil Economies Cope with
International Slump, WORLD OI Ou e(Jan. 2009), http://www.worldoil.com/January-2009South-American-oil-economies-cope-with-intemational-slump.html (reporting the location of
Brazil's pre-salt cluster in Figure 1).
1

FtoyStimates please see infra Part II.A.2.
Paulo Csar Ribeiro Lima,
o

Novo Marco Legal Para0 Prd-Sal Aprovado na Cdmarados
Deputados, in 28 COMUNICA AO & POLiTICA 147, 147 (2010), available at
http://www.cebela.org.br/site/baCMS/files/70634NCT4%20Paulo%20C%C3%A9sardo20Ribeiro
%20Lima.pdf.
1
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production of the oil discovered in the pre-salt area, and in 2010, Brazil
adopted the production sharing agreement regime ("PSA").14 Although it is not
the main purpose of this Article to discuss the political and technical reasons
that led Brazil to adopt its new regime, the low exploratory risk of the pre-salt
is one reason commonly used to justify the PSA. The low exploratory risk
means that drillers have very high chances of discovering commercial oil in the
pre-salt. Still, exploratory risk is not the same as development risk, which
involves extracting oil from ultra-deep reservoirs in extreme conditions not
5
largely tested, risk which is considerably high in the case of the pre-salt.1
Details of this PSA regime are explained in Part II.A.4.
Consequently, Brazil now has a dual regulatory regime for oil and gas
exploration and production: while the PSA governs exploration and production
of the oil fields located in the pre-salt area as well as those considered strategic
by a presidential decree, the concession regime governs all other fields. In fact,
28% of the pre-salt oil was already tendered under the concession regime
before pre-salt oil fields were officially discovered.' 6 In order to comprehend
the relevance of the pre-salt oil, the following Section provides an overview of
oil production and reserves in Brazil.
2.

Reserves and Production

As of 2011, Brazil's proven oil reserves amount to 15.1 billion barrels
(an increase of 0.9 billion barrels since 2010), which places the country in 14th
position (former 15th) for the world largest oil reserves.' 7 In 2010, Brazil
produced over 768.5 million barrels (representing an average annual increase of
4.2% in production), making it the 13th largest oil producer in the world.' 8
Lei No. 12,351, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
14
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil103/_Ato2007at
available
(Braz.),
23.12.2010
2010/2010/LeiIl2351.htm.
15
See Brazil's Oil Boom: Filling Up the Future, ECONOMIST (Nov. 5, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/21536570 [hereinafter OIL BooM]. In particular, extracting oil
from ultra-deep reservoirs requires equipment designed to endure extreme high pressure and low
temperatures, which is yet not fully available at a commercial level.
16
Gov'T OF BRAz., Novo MARCO REGULATORIO: PRIE-SAL E AREAS ESTRATIGICAS 4,
marcoregulatorio.pdf
available at http://www.mme.gov.br/mme/galerias/arquivos/presall
(undated).
17

AGENCIA NACIONAL

DO PETROLEO,

GAs NATURAL E BIOCOMBUSTiVEIs, ANUARIO
ESTATiSTICO BRASILEIRO DO PETROLEO, GAS NATURAL E BIOCOMBUSTiVEIs 8, 24 (2012)

http://www.anp.gov.br/?pgat
available
2012],
ANPGNB
[hereinafter
62402&m=&tl=&t2=&t3=&t4=&ar-&ps=&cachebust- 1363716523347; AGtNCIA NACIONAL
DO PETR6LEO, GAs NATURAL E BIOCOMBUSTiVEIs, ANuARIO ESTATisTIcO BRASILEIRO DO
available at
(2011),
24
BIOCOMBUSTivEIs
E
NATURAL
GAs
PETROLEo,

http://www.anp.gov.br/?pg-62402&m=&tl=&t2=&t3=&t4=&ar-&ps=&cachebust=1
6523347.
'
ANPGNB 2012, supra note 17, at 78.
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Pre-salt oil discoveries can potentially aggregate about 50'9 to 8020
billion barrels of oil equivalent to Brazil's reserves, boosting Brazil to one of
the top five oil producers by 2020.21 Indeed, 2011 was the first year of pre-salt
oil production (pre-salt areas under the concession regime) and the results were
promising: by the end of the year, Brazil produced 167,500 barrels per day of
oil and 5.3 million cubic meters per day of gas, corresponding to 7.5% of the
national production.22 These numbers point to the technical and commercial
feasibility of exploration and production at ultra-deep waters. As demonstrated
in the tables below, both reserves and production take place mainly off shore.
Proved oil reserves, by location 2002/11
164

-

---

--

-

-

-

Now -

6

14
2A
o

0

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-

Offshore -

Onshore

Figure 2
Figure Courtesy ofANPGNB 2 3

19

OIL BooM, supra note 15.

20

Cirilo Junior, Blocos do Prd-sal tim atd 80 Bi de Barris de Petr6leo e Gas, diz ANP,

FOLHA
DE
S.PAULO
/dinheiro/ult9 1u465318.shtml.

(Nov.

7,

2008),

21

OIL BooM, supranote 15.

22

ANPGNB 2012, supra note
17, at 8.

23

ANPGNB 2012, supra note 17, at 74 graph 2.1.
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Production, by location
:2.4

11.2
2.0

= 0.4

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-

Offshore -

Onshore

Figure 3
Figure Courtesy of ANPGNB

24

Brazil has twenty-nine sedimentary basins of hydrocarbon research
interest, the equivalent of 7.5 million square kilometers (about 2.9 million
square miles offshore). 25 But only a small percentage of these areas are
currently under concession for exploration and production.
Given an overview of the production and reserves rates, the following
Section provides a description of the concession regime main rules.
3.

Concession Regime

The Oil Act provides that exploration and production of oil and gas in
Brazil should be carried out under the concession regime.2 6 After a bidding
process, because the Union is the original holder of hydrocarbon rights, it
grants to the winning oil company ("OC") exclusivity to explore and produce
ANPGNB 2012, supra note 17, at 74 graph 2.5.
25
AGtNCIA NACIONAL DE PETROLEO, Brasil Estci Entre as Mais Atraentes Oportunidades
AM),
available at
11:40
2013,
19,
(Mar.
Mundo,
Exploratdrias do
http://www.anp.gov.br/?pg=65095&m=bacias%20sedimentares&tl=&t2=bacias%20sedimentare
s&t3=&t4=&ar-0&ps=l &cachebust-1364486961012.
26
Originally, the Oil Act did not contemplate the PSA. It was only in 2010 that Lei No.
12,351 introduced the PSA regime in the legal framework. Lei No 12,351 amended the Oil Act,
but it did not end the concession regime. Each regime is applicable according to the reserve
location, as detailed below. See Lei No. 12,351, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL DA
at
available
(Braz.),
23.12.2010
de
[D.O.U.]
UNIAO
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/201 0/Lei/L12351 .htm
24
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hydrocarbons within a determined area.27 The OC may participate in the
bidding process individually or organized in consortium, usually comprised of
both operating and non-operating members. Petrobras has been a major
participant, but is subject to the same retaining conditions as private companies.
The concession agreement is signed between NPA and the OC. The OC
may enter the agreement individually or in a consortium, according to the rules
and limitations provided by the invitations to bid. The agreement usually lasts
up to thirty-five years and is composed of an exploration phase and a
production phase. The exploration phase lasts between three and eight years, a
period during which the concessionaire must submit a Minimum Exploration
Plan ("MEP") for NPA's approval.28 The MEP is the bidder's commitment to
develop certain exploratory activities (measured in work unities), such as
2D/3D seismic activities and exploratory wells. As the execution of the MEP
reveals, the concessionaire must gradually return to NPA the areas it is not
interested in developing. The production phase can last up to twenty-seven
years during which the concessionaire chooses areas it deems commercially
viable and prepares a development plan. 2 9 The NPA is responsible for
supervising the performance of the development plan by the concessionaire.
The exploration, development, production, and decommissioning
activities are conducted at the concessionaire's sole costs and risk. In return, the
concessionaire becomes the owner of the hydrocarbons extracted, and it can
dispose of these resources pursuant to the concession agreement and the law.
The concessionaire also has exclusive control of operations and holds
both commercialization and exportation rights. It has the right to sell and export
the oil produced subject only to two possible restrictions: (i) a national
emergency declared by a presidential decree when oil and gas exportation may
be limited by NPA;30 (ii) the need of strategic reserves in the National System
of Fuel Stock (created for shortage situations) that may adversely affect the oil
supply. 3 ' However, this has never happened in Brazil, and neither NEPC nor
the Ministry of Mines and Energy have issued regulation regarding this topic.

27
BAIN & CO. & TOZZiNIFREIRE ADVOGADOS, STUDIES OF REGULATORY, CORPORATE AND
FINANCIAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION OF OIL AND GAS AND THE
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION CHAIN IN BRAZIL 17 (2009),

available
at
http://www.bain.com/bainweb/images/LocalOffices/BNDESConsolidated
Report BNDES eng.pdf.
28
Lei No. 9,478, art. 44, 111, de 6 de Agosto de 1997, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
7.8.1997 (Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/19478.htm.
29
Id. art. 26 § 1.
3o
This provision is provided by the concession agreement.
31
The National System of Fuel Stock was created by Lei No. 8.176 de 8 de Fevereiro de
1991, DiARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 13.2.1991 (Braz.), available at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/leis/L8176.htm#art4 and is regulated by Decreto No. 238,
de 24 de Outubro de 1991, DLRIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 25.10.1991 (Braz.), available
at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/1990-1994/D238.htm.
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Finally, the government take consists of a signature bonus,3 2 royalties,33
special participation,34 occupation and land retention fee, and general taxes
(income, profit, social security). The following Section details the process of
granting oil and gas exploration and production rights in Brazil, the so-called
"Brazilian Rounds."
a.

The Granting of Exploration and Production Rights:
Brazilian Rounds

The bidding process is conducted by the NPA through public tenders
called Brazilian rounds. Since 1999, NPA has conducted ten rounds,35 and the
eleventh was officially announced on January 24, 2013. The eleventh round
32

See infra Part II.A.3.a for further details on the signature bonus.

3
Usually 10% as provided by the Oil Act. Lei No. 9,478, art 47, de 6 de Agosto de 1997,
DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNILO [D.O.U.]
de 7.8.1997
(Braz.), available at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/19478.htm. According to the Oil Act, this amount may
be reduced to a minimum of 5% depending on NPA's assessment of the geological risk involved
and production expectations. Id. art. 47 § 1. Under the concession regime, royalty's income is
distributed among the federation under the following (simplified version of the) rule: the Union is
entitled to 40% while the states and municipalities where production takes place (when offshore,
the projection on their territories limits towards the ocean is considered) retain 22.5% and 30% of
the royalties, respectively. The remaining 7.5% is distributed equally among all other states and
municipalities. Id. art. 49. This rule has recently been partially revoked by the Federal Act. See
Lei No. 12,734 de 30 de Novembro de 2012, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 30.11.2012
(Braz.), availableat http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato20ll-2014/2012/Lei/Ll2734.htm.
This new Act changed the royalties' distribution rule (under the concession regime) to reduce the
share of the states and municipalities where production takes place and increase the others' share:
the Union is now entitled to 20%, the states and municipalities where production takes place
retains 20% and 15% (with an annual decreasing curve), respectively, and the remaining is
distributed among the others states and municipalities (with an annual increasing curve). Id. art.
42-B. The Act, however, is currently under heavy political pressure and it was partially vetoed by
the president in order to be applicable only to concession contracts signed after December 3,
2012 (thus maintaining the older distribution rule to the contracts signed before December 3,
2012). Mensagem No. 522 de 30 de Novembro de 2012, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
30.11.2012, rectified on 05.03.2013 (Braz.). Congress overruled the veto on March 7, 2013, but
on March 18 the Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction halting the effectiveness of Lei
No. 12,734 (Agao Direta de Inconstitucionalidade No. 4917), rendering ineffective the veto
overrule. On March 25, Congress filed a motion to overrule the Supreme Court's decision, which
was not yet decided by the time this Article was printed.
34
This means a special payment is due in case of large volumes of oil and gas or high
profitability, as provided by article 50 of the Oil Act. The payment varies in accordance with how
long the field is producing, the volumes produced, and place of operations (onshore, offshore,
shallow/deep waters), as established in Decreto No. 2.705, de 3 de Agosto de 1998, DIkRo
OFICIAL
DA
UNIAO
[D.O.U.]
de
30.11.2012
(Braz.),
available
at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/D2705.htm.
35
The tenth round was conducted in 2008 and the halt is majorly due to an intricate dispute
over the royalties' distribution among the Union, states, and municipalities. See sources cited
supra note 33 and accompanying text.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

984

[Vol. 115

will offer 289 blocks, totaling 96.809 square miles, distributed in eleven
sedimentary basins.36 The public tender is expected to be conducted on the 1 4th
and 1 5th of May 2013.
As of the end of 2011, 736 areas were under concession, the majority
of which were in production phase.n Each round must be initially authorized
by the NEPC. The next step is the determination by the NPA of the fields that
will be tendered in the proceeding. Once the tendering fields are defined, the
round is publicly announced and the invitation to bid and the draft of the
concession agreement are published for public analysis. This step is followed
by a public hearing, a sequence of technical and legal debates that result in the
publication of the final versions of both the invitation to bid and the concession
agreement.38 Then the period starts for bidders to file their qualification
documents. After this phase is over, bidders (individually or organized in
consortiums) present their offers, and the NPA conducts the bid auction.
The selection usually includes three criteria: (i) a signature bonus; (ii)
local content; and (iii) the analysis of the MEP. 39 A signature bonus is the
amount of money offered by the bidder to explore and produce the field, paid
when the concession agreement is signed, and the local content represents the
bidder's commitment to contract a minimum percentage of goods and services
with Brazilian companies. On one hand, the local content requirement has been
targeted as an inhibitor of oil development in Brazil due to the challenges in
complying with this regulation. A study prepared for the Brazilian National
Petroleum Industry Organization ("ONIP"), found that Brazilian producers in
the oil services industry charge 55% more than their international competitors,
thus hampering efficiency and competition.40 On the other hand, the NPA
maintains that the local content requirement fosters the development of local
suppliers and technology resulting in higher employment rates and income
growth.

See AgEncia Nacional do Petr6leo, GAs Natural e Biocombustiveis, Superintendincia de
http://www.brasilBRASIL
11
RODADA,
PromogOes
de
Licitag5es-SPL,
rounds.gov.br/roundl l/portugues rl 1/areas oferecidas.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
3
ANPGNB 2012, supra note 17, at 57.
3
For an English version of the invitation to bid and concession agreement of the tenth round,
see,
Final
Tender
Protocol
and
Contract,
BRASIL
10
RODADA,
http://www.anp.gov.br/brnd/roundl0/ingles/edital.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
3

AGENCIA NACIONAL DO PETROLEO, GAs NATURAL E BIOCOMBUSTiVEIS,

FINAL TENDER

available at
http://www.anp.gov.br/bmd/roundl0/arquivos/editais/ft%20Protocol%20RIO %2OFinal%20versi
on.pdf. In the tenth round these criteria were weighted as follow: (i) signature bonus (40%); (ii)
local content (20%); and (iii) minimum working program (40%). Id. at 33, 38-39.
PROTOCOL

40

FOR

THE

GRANTING

OF

CONCESSION

AGREEMENTS

(2008),

Booz & Co., COMPETITIVE AGENDA FOR OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS SUPPLY CHAIN IN BRAZIL

69 (2011), available at http://novosite.onip.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/English-versionfinal.pdf.
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After explaining the main characteristics of the concession regime, the
following Section describes Brazil's regulatory framework applicable to presalt areas: the production sharing agreement.
4.

Production Sharing Agreement 4'

The main characteristic of the PSA is that it inverts the concession
logic of exploited hydrocarbons ownership. Instead of being owned by the OC
42
that drilled it, the extracted oil still belongs to the government.
In the PSA-as in the concession regime-the government provides
exclusivity of the tendered area to the bid winner (hereinafter "consortium"). 4 3
The consortium shall also explore the field and produce the oil at its own risk
and cost. When the field is found to be commercially viable, the consortium is
entitled to receive a share of the produced oil for the purpose of reimbursing its
exploration and production costs - the so-called cost oil.44 The remaining
oil-the so-called profit oil-is shared between the government and the
consortium according to the terms of the production sharing agreement. 4 5 Thus,
under the PSA, the government take is paid through its share of profit oil as
well the payment of a signature bonus 46 and royalties. 4 7

Lei No. 12,351, art. 3. de 22 de Dezembro de 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
23.12.2010
(Braz.),
available
at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil03/ Ato20072010/2010/Lei/L1235 1.htm.
42
From an economic perspective, "[t]he most marked difference between concession . . . [and
PSA] is that reserves and production do not vary in response to oil price movements for
concession fields, while both production and reserves vary under PSC regimes.. .. When oil
prices rise the number of barrels of oil needed to pay for the [OC] costs [cost oil] and profits
[profit oil] are reduced." See Petter Osmundsen, Chasing Reserves-Incentives and Ownership,
2.1 (U.S. Ass'n for Energy Econ., Int'l Ass'n for Energy Econ. Working Paper, USAEE WP 09025 (2009)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1517154.
43
Because Petrobras has a mandatory participation in exploration and production under this
regime (as explained below), the bid winner will always be a consortium formed by the private
parties participating in the tender and Petrobras. The specific rules and limitations in forming the
consortium are set forth in the invitations to bid.
4
Lei No. 12,351, art. 20, II, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.]
de 23.12.2010 (Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato20072010/201 0/Lei/L1235 .htm.
45
A minimum percentage (yet to be defined) of profit oil must be guaranteed to the Brazilian
government. Id. art. 10, II, b.
46
Lei No. 12,351, art. 42, 1,de 22 de Dezembro de 2010, DIARIo OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.]
de 23.12.2010 (Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/ Ato20072010/2010/LeilL12351.htm. The signature bonus is not included in the cost oil and must be paid
when the parties signed the agreement.
47
Id. art. 42, II. The royalties are also not included in the cost oil and its distribution under
the PSA regime was also regulated by the Federal Act. See Lei No. 12,734, art. 2 § 1, de 30 de
Novembro de 2012, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNLO [D.O.U.] de 30.11.2012 (Braz.), available
41
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In 2010, Brazil incorporated Petr6leo e Gis Natural S.A. ("PPSA"), a
100% government-owned company, to be responsible for managing the
production sharing agreements and the sale of the government's share of oil
output.48 PPSA represents the Union in the production sharing agreement and
in the unitization 49 process but has no responsibility over exploration and
production activities. Although PPSA bears no entrepreneurial risk, it has
mandatory participation in all consortiums formed to explore and produce oil in
the pre-salt as well as the right to nominate the majority of the operational
committee,50 including its president who has a tie-breaking vote.5
The Brazilian PSA regime also contemplates a relevant role for
Petrobras as the sole operator of the oil fields. The other parties may only
participate as non-operators, according to the terms and limitations set forth in
the invitations to bid. Further, as a legal requirement, Petrobras must hold a

at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil-03/Ato2Oll-2014/2012/Lei/L12734.htm. Under the PSA
regime, the Union is entitled to 22% of the royalties income, which must go to the Social Fund,
see supra Part II.A.3, while the states and municipalities where production takes place (when
offshore, the projection on their territories limits towards the ocean is considered) retains 22%
and 5% of the royalties, respectively. Lei No. 12,734, art. 42-A, de 30 de Novembro de 2012,
[D.O.U.] de 30.11.2012 (Braz.), available at
DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2Oll-2014/2012/Lei/L12734.htm, . The remaining is
distributed equally among all other states and municipalities. The logic of paying royalties to the
states and municipalities where the production takes place offshore was questioned because the
pre-salt exploration is conducted far from the coast shore with almost no impact to these
locations. The underlying idea of compensating the states and municipalities where the
production takes place for the burden of hosting these activities makes less sense under the PSA
than it did under the concession regime.
48
Lei No. 12,304, art. 1, de 2 de Agosto de 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Ato20073.8.2010
(Braz.),
available
2010/2010/Lei/LI2304.htm.
49
Unitization is an agreement between the government and the OC (or consortium) that
tenders an oil field that actually extends beyond the tendered area. The NPA is responsible for
ratifying these agreements. Until 2010, unitization was regulated by article 27 of the Oil Act,
which was revoked when the PSA regime was enacted. See Lei No. 12,351, art. 67, de 22 de
Dezembro de 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.20 10 (Braz.), available at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/ Ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/Ll2351.htm. Currently there is a
public hearing process being conduct by NPA to discuss unitization regulation. All the
documents related to this hearing are available at Consultas e Audidncias Publicas em
Andamento, AGtNCIA NACIONAL DO PETROLEO, GAs NATURAL E BIOCOMBUSTiVEIS,
http://www.anp.gov.br/?pg-65066 (last visited Apr. 24, 2013).
5o
The operational committee is a mandatory body in every consortium and is responsible,
among other things, for the definition of the exploration plan, the declaration of commercial
viability of each reserve and the approval of the consortium's annual budget for the exploration
and production activities. Lei No. 12,351, art. 23, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010, DIARIO
available
at
de
23.12.2010
(Braz.),
OFICIAL
DA
UNIAO
[D.O.U.]
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12351.htm.
51

Id. art. 25.
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share of at least 30% of each field tendered,52 which means that just as with
PPSA, Petrobras has mandatory participation in all consortiums formed to
explore and produce oil (as the sole operator). Petrobras may also be directly
retained (no public procurement procedure required) by the Union to explore
and produce certain oil fields, 3 in which case it would hold 100% of the field
interest, as no private party is allowed to be retained without a previous public
tender procedure. If not directly retained, Petrobras may participate with the
other parties in the tender procedure to increase its 30% mandatory share.
Finally, Petrobras may also act as the Union's agent in the disposition of the
government's share of profit oil through refining and sale.
The award of exploration and production rights must be preceded by a
public tender procedure. However, as opposed to the concession regime, the
President, upon CNEP proposal, defines the tendering fields under the PSA
regime. Selection of the best bid will be based on the highest offer of profit oil
for the government.55 Income resulting from the sale of profit oil, a share of the
signature bonus, and the Union's share of royaltieS5 6 will be deposited in the
Social Fund, a sovereign fund whose resources will be used by the Union to
finance projects fostering education, culture, science and technology,
environmental sustainability development, and the reduction of poverty in
Brazil.s?
Finally, it should be pointed out that Brazil has never yet conducted a
public tender for the pre-salt oil, so the PSA has not been tested. The first round
was expected in 2011, but it was postponed, mostly due to the pending
58
controversy over the royalty division. Now it is expected to happen in late
November 2013.59
B.

American Leasing

The previous Sections described the Brazilian dual regime with its
main characteristics, the role of the regulatory agencies and the process of

52

Id. art. 10 § 111(c).

5
Id. arts. 8, I & 12 (stating that Petrobras can be directly retained to pursue the national
interest and to achieve energy policy goals).
54
Id. arts. 8, II. But see text accompanying supra note 53).

ss

Id. art. 18.
See text accompanying supra note 47 (discussing royalties).
5
Lei No. 12,351, art. 47, de 22 de Dezembro de 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 23.12.2010 (Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato20072010/2010/Lei/L12351.htm.
5
See sources cited supra notes 33 and 47 and accompanying text.
5
See Memorandum from Mattos Filho, Veiga Filho, Marrey Jr e Quiroga Advogados to
Clients
(Jan.
11,
2013),
available
at
http://www.mattosfilho.com.br/pagina.
php?item=Memos&pag=537 1&lang=en.
56
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granting exploration and production rights. The following Sections mirror this
effort for the American regulatory framework.
1.

Overview

American leasing of oil and gas is also considered a concession regime,
with its own peculiarities. Regulation of exploration and production depends on
whether the leased area is under state or federal jurisdiction. Aside from their
own territory, the states have jurisdiction over areas up to three miles from the
coast shore60 while the federal government has power over its own onshore
lands 61 and the offshore areas outside the state reach, including the outer
continental shelf up to a distance recognized by international law (for the most
part 200 miles).62
While each state has its own regulatory body, U.S. federal regulation is
conducted onshore by the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"), on Indian
lands by the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"), and offshore by three agencies:
(i) the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement ("BSEE"), which is
responsible for safety issues, environment protection, and offshore resources
conservation; (ii) the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management ("BOEM"), which
manages exploration and development of offshore resources; and (iii) the
Office of Natural Resources Revenue ("ONRR"), which is responsible for
collecting revenue from mineral leases covering federal lands.
The distinctive feature of the American regime is that hydrocarbons are
often privately owned. Unless separated by a deed or other agreement,
hydrocarbon rights are owned by the surface owner 6 3 and can be traded as other
real estate property. Although oil and gas laws vary by state, the laws regarding
ownership prior to, at, and after extraction are quite standardized in the United
States. Currently, transactions involving privately owned minerals dominate,
and only 30% of United States mineral rights are located in federal lands. 64
Due to the fluid nature of hydrocarbons, the common law rule of
ownership under which rights extend vertically downward from the property
line-the "ad coelum" doctrine, whereby the property owner has the right to
own everything from the heavens above the surface of his land to the core of
the earth beneath it65-was not appropriate to govern the extraction of
petroleum. Thus, the rule of capture doctrine was developed to modify the ad
coelum doctrine albeit with its own inherent limitations and restrictions

60

62

63
64

65

U.S. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (2006).
See, e.g., The Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2006).
See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 133 1(a), (e) (2006).
Offshore oil is owned by the state or federal government according to its location.
Id.
JOHN S. LoWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 8 (5th
ed. 2003).
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW INA NUTSHELL 224
(2d ed. 2011).
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provided by the doctrine of correlative rights and conservation laws. This
discussion is detailed in Part III.A. 1.
After this overview, the following Section provides information on the
United States reserves and production rates demonstrating the global relevance
of the country.
2.

Reserves and Production

The United States has the twelfth largest proven oil reserves in the
world with 30.9 billion barrels as of 2011 (a steady amount since 2009).66 It is
also the 3rd largest oil producer with a production of 7,841 million barrels per
day (2011 estimate).67 As of 2010, all federal acreage, "both onshore and
offshore, [held] more than 2,000 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (about
seventy-five years' worth of current domestic consumption) and 229 billion
barrels of oil (about fifty years' worth)."68
The United States also has a Strategic Petroleum Reserve ("SPR"), an
emergency storage of oil maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy. The
SPR is a complex of four sites with deep underground storage caverns created
in salt domes along the Texas and Louisiana Gulf Coasts with investments of
about $22 billion to date ($5 billion for facilities; $17 billion for crude oil). 69 At
its completion, SPR held 727 million barrels of oil, the largest stockpile of
government-owned emergency crude oil in the world. 70 The SPR was created in
the aftermath of the 1973-74 oil embargo to provide security in case of
disruptions. The Energy Policy Act of 200571 directed the Secretary of Energy
to fill the SPR to its authorized one billion barrel capacity.72
Full drawdowns and sale of petroleum products from the SPR may
only be made if "the President has found that drawdown and sale are required
by a severe energy supply interruption or by obligations of the United States

ANPGNB 2012, supra note 17, at 25.
Id. at 29.
68
Christopher Helman, Study: Fed Lands Hold Oil and Gas Bonanza, FORBES (Feb.
15,
2010, 2:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2010/02/15/study-fed-lands-hold-oiland-gas-bonanza/.
69
SPR
Facts
&
Frequent
Questions,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
ENERGY,
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs//reserves/spr/spr-facts.html (last updated Feb. 22, 2013).
70
Petroleum
Reserves,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
ENERGY,
http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/reserves/index.html (last updated Mar. 19, 2013) ("During July
and August 2011, inventory was reduced to 695.9 million barrels after 30.59 million barrels were
sold in response to sustained interruptions in global supplies due to civil unrest in Libya.").
n1 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
72
42 U.S.C. § 6240(e) (repealed 2000).
66
67
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under the international energy program."73 In these cases, the Secretary shall
sell the petroleum products at public sale to the highest qualified bidder.74
Limited drawdowns may take place
[i]f the President finds that-(A) a circumstance, other than
those described in subsection (d) of this section, exists that
constitutes, or is likely to become, a domestic or international
energy supply shortage of significant scope or duration; (B)
action taken under this subsection would assist directly and
significantly in preventing or reducing the adverse impact of
such shortage; and (C) the Secretary of Defense has found that
action taken under this subsection will not impair national
security. 75
Finally, the Secretary is authorized to carry out test drawdown and sale or
exchange of petroleum products from the SPR provided that "[s]uch a test
drawdown and sale or exchange may not exceed 5,000,000 barrels of petroleum
products."7 Exchanges have been used in the past to replace less suitable
grades of crude oil with higher-quality crudes and for limited, short-duration
actions to assist petroleum companies in resolving oil delivery problems.n
Given an overview of the production and reserves rates as well as the
role of the SPR, the following Section provides a description of the leasing
regime's main rules.

7
74

42 U.S.C. § 6241(d)(1) (2006).
Id. § 6241(e)(1).

42 U.S.C. § 6241(h)(1)(A)-(C). Limited drawdowns are further restricted as follows:
Petroleum products from the Reserve may not be drawn down under this
subsection-(A) in excess of an aggregate of 30,000,000 barrels with respect
to each such shortage; (B) for more than 60 days with respect to each such
shortage; (C) if there are fewer than 500,000,000 barrels of petroleum
product stored in the Reserve; or (D) below the level of an aggregate of
500,000,000 barrels of petroleum product stored in the Reserve.
Id § 6241(h)(2)(A)-(D).
76
Id. § 6241 (g)(1).
7

77

In 2000, crude oil from the Reserve was exchanged for storage capacity and
stocks to create the Northeast Heating Oil Reserve. During Fall 2005, an
exchange was conducted at the request of refineries in the Gulf Region when
Hurricane Katrina caused disruptions to scheduled deliveries. During 2006,
small exchanges occurred in January and June when accidents in shipping
channels disrupted marine deliveries to refiners. In 2008, test exchange
authority was used to provide crude oil to industry after Hurricanes Gustav
and Ike shut down Gulf production and marine deliveries along the Gulf
Coast. Short-term, discrete time exchanges are sometimes referred to as
loans.
SPR Facts& FrequentQuestions, supra note 69.
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Lease Agreement

American leasing of oil and gas is formalized in a lease agreement. A
"[l]ease means any contract, profit-share arrangement, joint venture, or other
agreement issued or approved by the United States under a mineral leasing law
that authorizes exploration for, extraction of, or removal of oil or gas."7 The
lessor may be the government or a private party, depending on the ownership
status of the area where the leased field is located. The lessee is an OC or a
consortium formed by two or more companies interested in the exploration and
production of the oil and gas. The terms of the lease govern the activities,
duties, and rights of the lessees and the lessor. Federal and state regulations
govern the protection of the environment, safety issues, and other matters.
Leases that are negotiated between private parties may follow widely used
forms or may contain terms and conditions specific to the given lease.
Commonly, the lessee is granted the right to develop the leased land for
an agreed term albeit without any obligation to do so. If production is obtained,
the lessee has the right to maintain the lease for as long as production is
economically feasible. 7 9 As a type of concession, the hydrocarbons become the
lessee's property once they are extracted. Likewise the lessee bears all the costs
and risks related to exploration and development activities.
Similarly to the concession agreement, oil and gas leases are typically
divided into two phases in the so-called habendum clause.8 0 The clause
provides for a primary term that usually lasts "from one year for proven
reserves to [ten] years for undeveloped areas," and a conditional secondary
term tied to the production life of the field(s) contemplated by the agreement. 81
During the first term, the lessee does not have the obligation to drill, as it will
use this period to conduct geophysical and geological tests in the area to assess
location characteristics. The condition of the secondary term is the production
of oil or gas: if the lessee has not started producing after the first term, the lease
may expire.82 In some cases, the agreement may not require production to
extend the lease into the secondary term, but in such an event the lease usually
imposes other requirements, such as drilling test wells or payment of a delay
rental.
Payments to the lessor typically take three forms: bonus, delay rentals,
and royalties. The bonus is an up-front payment to the lessor in compensation
for the lessee's right to drill. Like in Brazil, where the signature bonus is also a
payment made by the bid winner when it signs the concessions agreement, here
78

7
80
81

43 C.F.R. § 3160.0-5 (2012).
LOWE, supra note 64, at 169.
Id. at 192.
CHARLES CALDWELL ET AL., OIL REGULATION IN 28 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE
145, 147

(2009).
82

See id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

17

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 7
992

WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 115

the same applies. However, unlike in Brazil, where the bonus is always a
government take, in the United States the bonus is owned to the lessor, no
matter if a private party or not. The delay rentals are fees paid to the lessor,
usually on an annual basis, until such time as the property begins producing oil
or gas in commercial quantities. As the name suggests, this allows for delays in
production or commencement of drilling without terminating the lease. Lastly,
the royalty is paid to the lessor as a compensation for the exploration of oil and
gas. Due to the hydrocarbons ownership rule, the government only receives
royalties if production and exploration takes place on public property.
Because there is a plurality of players who account as lessors, the lease
agreement may be negotiated both directly or preceded by a public tender
procedure. When the lessor is a private party, the lease is usually negotiated
directly. Each state will be responsible for granting leases in their respective
lands, as well as offshore areas located within three miles of the coast.
If the oil field is located onshore in federal lands, the lease is granted
by the BLM and regulated by the Mineral Leasing Act.83 In this case, the lease
conveys to the lessee the right to develop resources in the leased area. Prior to
conducting any surface-disturbing activities, the lessee will have to obtain
BLM's approval. Federal lands cannot be leased until they are first offered
competitively at an oral auction.84 The competitive bid can be initiated by the
BLM, or by an interested party who can request that specific lands be offered
competitively by filing an expression of interest ("EOI"), or a noncompetitive
"presale" lease offer, which is a formal nomination for lands to be offered
competitively.86 The winner is the "highest oral bid made by a qualified bidder,
equal to or exceeding the national minimum acceptable bid." 87 Lands that have
been offered competitively and received no bids shall be available for leasing
noncompetitively for two years through the filing of a "Postsale" Lease Offer.88
Oil and gas leases granted by the BLM expire at the end of their ten-year term
for competitive or noncompetitive leases, which may be extended if diligent
drilling operations are in progress, or in case the lease contains a well capable

Federal Regulations governing oil and gas leasing can be found at 43 C.F.R. §§ 3000-3195
(2012).
84
43 C.F.R. § 3120.1-1(2012).
85
For more details on the EOI, see Colorado: Expressions of Interest, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, http://www.blm.gov/co/st/en/BLMPrograms/oilandgas/expressions_of interest.html
(last updated Mar. 6, 2013).
86
For more details on the noncompetitive "presale" lease offer requirements and implications
see Idaho: Noncompetitive Oil and Gas Lease Offers, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
http://www.blm.gov/id/st/en/prog/energy
minerals/energy/oil-and gasO/
noncompetitive oilO.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
87
43 C.F.R. § 3120.5-1(b).
88 43 C.F.R. § 3110.1(b).
83
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of producing oil or gas in paying quantities. Rental and royalties are paid to the
Office of Natural Resources Revenue. 8 9
The tribes in Indian lands, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Interior, may enter into any joint venture, operating, production sharing,
service, managerial, lease or other agreement, providing (i) for the development
of natural resources, including oil and gas, in which such Indian tribe owns an
interest; or (ii) for the sale or other disposition of such resources. 90 The
issuance of leases within these areas is conducted by the BIA in coordination
with the BLM. BIA allows for direct negotiations that are in the best interest of
the tribes. 9'
In federally-owned offshore fields, the BOEM is responsible for
developing a Five Year Leasing Program specifying the size, time, and location
of federal areas that will be available for lease. 9 2 Offshore leases are governed
by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and are offered competitively to the
highest bid in a public tender. 9 3 The process is complex and makes an effort to
balance different interests as they affect natural resources and the
environmental. It starts with the nomination of potential producers,
identification of the area to be explored and the draft of a final environmental
impact statement ("EIS") pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act.9 4
Following the publication of the final EIS the Notice of Proposed Sale is issued
with a notice on the bidding procedure.95 The bidding is conducted by sealed
bid and, at the discretion of the Secretary of Interior, may be based on a variety
of criteria such as cash bonus with a fixed royalty, a royalty bid with a
determined cash bonus or various combinations of them, which also includes
parameters such as work commitment and share of net profits.9 6 The Secretary
89

30 CFR § 1218.50 and § 1218.100.
90
25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (2006).
91 Id. § 2102(b).
92
The current Five Year Leasing Program is the OCS Oil & Gas Leasing Program for 20122017, which went into effect on August 27, 2012, and will expire on August 26, 2017. See Five
Year Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Oil and Gas Leasing Program,BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY

MGMT., http://www.boem.gov/5-year/2012-2017 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
9
See 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).
See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2006).
94
95

TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 65, at 257.

96

Examples of others criteria are:
(A) cash bonus bid with a royalty at not less than [12.5] per centum fixed by
the Secretary of Interior in amount or value of the production saved,
removed, or sold; (B) variable royalty bid based on a per centum in amount
or value of the production saved, removed, or sold, with either a fixed work
commitment based on dollar amount for exploration or a fixed cash bonus as
determined by the Secretary of Interior, or both; (C) cash bonus bid, or work
commitment bid based on a dollar amount for exploration with a fixed cash
bonus, and a diminishing or sliding royalty based on such formulae as the
Secretary of Interior shall determine as equitable to encourage continued
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of Interior may also increase, reduce, or eliminate royalties or net profit shares
at its own discretion to induce the production of a leased area. 97 The bidding
system aims to balance a range of concerns-from economic to social and
environmental as well as to ensure the government's fair market price. 9 8 As
detailed in a House of Representatives Conference Report,
in utilizing the new bidding alternatives, a variety of
considerations should be taken into account, including but not
limited to: (i) providing a fair return to the Federal
Government; (ii) increasing competition; (iii) assuring
competent and safe operations; (iv) avoiding undue
speculation; (v) avoiding unnecessary delays in exploration,
development, and production; (vi) discovering and recovering
oil and gas; (vii) developing new oil and gas resources in an
efficient and timely manner; and (viii) limiting administrative
burdens on government and industry. 99
These concerns demonstrate how different interests are assembled together in
the bidding system.
After this overview of both the Brazilian and American legal regimes
for the exploration and production of oil and gas, Part III aims to analyze in
more detail some comparative aspects of each regulatory framework.

production from the lease area as resources diminish, but not less than [12.5]
per centum at the beginning of the lease period in amount or value of the
production saved, removed, or sold; (D) cash bonus bid with a fixed share of
the net profits of no less than 30 per centum to be derived from the
production of oil and gas from the lease area; (E) fixed cash bonus with the
net profit share reserved as the bid variable; (F) cash bonus bid with a royalty
at no less than [12.5] per centum fixed by the Secretary of Interior in amount
or value of the production saved, removed, or sold and a fixed per centum
share of net profits of no less than 30 per centum to be derived from the
production of oil and gas from the lease area; (G) work commitment bid
based on a dollar amount for exploration with a fixed cash bonus and a fixed
royalty in amount or value of the production saved, removed, or sold; (H)
cash bonus bid with royalty at no less than 12 and [0.5] per centum fixed by
the Secretary of Interior in amount or value of production saved, removed, or
sold, and with suspension of royalties for a period, volume, or value of
production determined by the Secretary of Interior, which suspensions may
vary based on the price of production from the lease; or (I) subject to certain
requirements provided by paragraph (4) of [43 U.S.C. § 1337], any
modification of bidding systems authorized in subsections (A) through (G),
or any other systems of bid variables, terms, and conditions which the
Secretary of Interior determines to be useful to accomplish the purposes and
policies of [43 U.S.C. § 1337], except that no such bidding system or
modification shall have more than one bid variable.
43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A}-(I).
9
43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3)(A).
98
Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 213-14 (1981).
99
H.R. REP. No. 91474, at 92 (1978) (Conf. Rep.).
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III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ToPIcs
This Part selects two topics-hydrocarbons ownership and oil
companies-to discuss in more depth the comparative approach of both Brazil
and the United States to them. Overall, this Part seeks to reveal the origins and
consequences of public versus private ownership of hydrocarbons as well as the
differences and roles of national versus international oil companies.
A.

Hydrocarbons Ownership

A relevant difference between the Brazilian and American regimes lies
in the ownership of hydrocarbons in situ. While Brazil has historically affirmed
its ownership over natural resources that are in the ground, the United States
adopts private ownership as the rule. The Brazilian approach is the most
common worldwide, as most countries retain ownership of valuable natural
resources.10 0 The American rule, on the contrary, evolved from the common
law ad coelum doctrine.o'0 However, as explained below, the ad coelum
doctrine was not an adequate approach to dealing with ownership of oil and gas
resources.
1.

The Rule of Capture

Early in the history of United States oil and gas development, it
became clear that the ad coelum doctrine was suitable to deal with solid
minerals but would be inappropriate to manage fluid resources like oil and gas.
Hydrocarbons are fugacious (they tend to escape) and move around within a
reservoir without respect to property boundaries, in such a way that absolute
ownership ceases when oil and gas migrates. 102 If the ad coelum doctrine were
adopted to govern oil and gas extraction, the industry would likely be
discouraged by the imminent liabilities of drilling resources on a neighbor's
land. Thus, the rule of capture was developed in the late nineteenth century to
transform the ad coelum doctrine and provide a more suitable legal framework
to deal with the exploration of oil and gas.1 03
The seminal decision in this respect was the 1889 Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania case of Westmoreland and Cambria Natural Gas Co. v.
De Witt,104 which stated that

100

lot
102

LOWE, supranote 64, at 8.
See supra Part II.B.L
Bryan Clark, Migratory Things on Land: PropertyRights and a Law of

§ 5.3.1 (Oct. 2002), availableat http://www.ejcl.org/63/art63-3.html#N1
103

LOWE, supra note 64, at 9-10.

104

18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889).
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[u]nlike other minerals, [water, oil, and gas] have the power
and the tendency to escape without the volition of the owner.
"Their fugitive and wandering existence within the limits of a
particular tract was uncertain," ..... They belong to the owner

of the land, and are part of it, so long as they are on or in it, and
are subject to his control; but when they escape, and go into
other land, or come under another's control, the title of the
former owner is gone. Possession of the land, therefore, is not
necessarily possession of the gas. 05
In sum, the rule of capture states that there is no liability for capturing
oil and gas that drains from someone's land to the driller's well because the
driller acquires ownership over the extracted hydrocarbons even though such
hydrocarbons have migrated from adjoining lands.10 6 Clearly, the rule of
capture departs widely from the ad coelum doctrine, and some authors see it as
a "rule of convenience"' 0 and a "judicial policy-making to encourage
development of oil and gas resources." 08
As a rule of nonliability, the rule of capture gives landowners incentive
to drill as many wells as quickly as possible because if they do not, others will
capture the natural resources beneath their lands. Due to its negative
externalities, the rule of capture has certain limitations comprised of (i) inherent
limitations, (ii) the doctrine of correlative rights, and (iii) conservation laws. 0 9
One of the inherent limitations of the rule of capture regards escaped
hydrocarbons. If the driller, for some reason, loses possession of the oil and gas
he has already extracted, he will not lose his ownership of them. There is no
transfer of rights in the recapture of escaped hydrocarbons because such a rule
would not foster the policy goals of the rule of capture. 10 Courts have also
recognized inherent limitations to the rule of capture in situations where
drainage has been performed by enhanced-recovery operations, which are
procedures that improve the reservoir production capacity."' Tomain defends
the need to distinguish reservoirs that can be produced by primary-recovery
techniques from those that can only be produced through the use of secondary
or tertiary-recovery techniques in order for this limitation to be in line with the
rule of capture policy goals.1 2 An interest would not be protected by failing to

105 Id at 725 (quoting Brown v. Vandegrift, 80 Pa. 147, 148 (1975)).
106
LOwE, supranote 64, at 9-10.
107

id.
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Id at 11.
Id at 12.
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apply the rule of capture to the drainage of a reservoir that can only be drilled
through the use of secondary or tertiary-recovery techniques." 3
The second limitation to the rule of capture is the doctrine of
correlative rights, which states that "an owner who exercises the right to
capture oil and gas is subject to the concomitant duty to exercise the right
without negligence or waste.'14 The doctrine aims to provide each owner of a
common reservoir the right of a fair chance to produce oil and gas in a
reasonable proportion. It thus limits the rule of capture by bringing liability to
wasteful-production techniques and negligent damage to the ability of third
parties to produce a determined reservoir." 5
Lastly, the rule of capture is limited by conservation laws in ways not
accomplished by the inherent limitations or the doctrine of correlative rights. In
fact, neither limitation can effectively prevent economic and physical waste in
the sense of controlling the number of wells drilled over a single reservoir and
the intensity of the production.1 6 Therefore, states began developing
conservation laws to internalize the costs arising from the rule of capture,
transforming it into a "fair share" doctrine."' 7 Oil and gas conservation laws
purport to rationally develop hydrocarbons by creating, for example, wellspacing rules to prevent over-drilling and production regulation to inhibit waste
and protect correlative rights.
Once the rule of capture-which explains the rationale behind the
private ownership of hydrocarbons in the United States-is described, the
following Section compares the different approaches of each country and the
strategic relevance of hydrocarbon ownership.
2.

Strategic Relevance of Hydrocarbons Ownership

Brazilian and American legal differences to in situ ownership of
hydrocarbons are largely a reflection of Brazil's historical resource nationalism
as opposed to the American common law culture of limited government
intervention in property rights. It could be argued that public ownership of
hydrocarbons provides the government with more flexibility to foster national
policy goals as expressed, for example, by the local content requirement of
Brazil's regulation."' 8 Changing the regulatory framework-as seen with the
introduction of the PSA in a context previously ruled by the concession
regime-also demonstrates the Brazilian government's greater flexibility to

113

Id

114

Id. at 14-15; see also Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948).
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change the rules of the game when it owns the resources (note that under PSA
even the extracted hydrocarbons are owned by the government).
Conversely, it is difficult to imagine the United States furnishing all
new rules to change the current setting of hydrocarbons property rights. Such
transformation implies a shift of natural resource ownership from the
landowner to the American government that would likely face considerable
resistance from a culture where the concept of private property is deeply
rooted. Nevertheless, the United States may pursue national policy goals
through regulation-such as was seen during the price, allocation and
entitlement control era (1970-1980)"l 9 -as well as with the new safety and
environmental standards required for deep-water drilling after the April 2010
Deepwater Horizon accident.12 0
Actually, in assessing the strategic relevance of hydrocarbons
ownership, countries consider the property above extracted oil a more
important aspect than ownership in situ. To fully understand this issue and how
Brazil and the United States differ in this regard, we must take a look at the
roles played by IOCs and NOCs.
B.

NOC v. IOC

1.

The Origins of the NOCs

Ever since oil began to play a relevant role in the global economy,
governments have been concerned with establishing greater control over their
oil supplies. This concern dates back to Churchill's time when the British
government purchased fifty-one shares in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.121
Other countries followed the trend, creating partially or fully owned NOCs to
foster secure and reliable energy supplies such as Russia's Gazprom or the
China National Petroleum Corporation.
The notion that governments should have control over their oil remains
true today. Although today oil is an international commodity, the quest for
access continues worldwide. Memories of the OPEC embargo in 1973-74 and
political instability in the Persian Gulf and in Latin America are probable
drivers of these concerns. Thus, governments often seek some degree of control

119

See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 65, at 237.

See Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of the Interior, Salazar: Deepwater Drilling May Resume for
Operators Who Clear Higher Bar for Safety, Environmental Protection (Oct. 12, 2010), available
at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Deepwater-Drilling-May-Resume-forOperators-Who-Clear-Higher-Bar-for-Safety-Environmental-Protection.cfm.
120
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DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPic QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, & POWER 158 (1993).

Anglo-Persian later became Anglo-Iranian, and then in 1954 British Petroleum (BP). See British
Petroleum - BP (and other appellations) CIA - British Government Files, available at
http://www.paperlessarchives.com/bpbritish_petroleumcia.html.
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over oil supplies.12 2 Not surprisingly, 77% of the global oil reserves are held by
NOCs.123 Naturally, NOCs are viewed as more susceptible to government
control than the privately-owned major IOCs such as United States-based
ExxonMobil and Chevron.
Once the historical background that leads to the incorporation of the
NOCs worldwide is explained, the following Section describes the NOC and
the IOC models for development of hydrocarbons.
2.

The Two Models

Whereas Brazil opted for the NOC model, the United Stated opted for
the IOCs to develop the oil and gas sector. These choices are marked by
contrasting views and strong arguments on both sides. Supporters of the IOC
model argue for a free market in which markets are considered reliable enough
124
to, even in cases of disruption events, allocate oil according to price, not
political preferences. This view sees resource nationalism as having no
perceptible effect on the energy security of other countries because oil
companies (regardless of ownership) will base their decision of consumption
and sales on profits, and a major component to be considered is the price of
transporting oil.125 Thus, if oil is produced by a NOC in fields far from its host
country, it makes more sense to sell the oil to closer markets than to transport it
all the way home. Moreover, this view argues that even in a scenario where the
NOC decides to bring home all of the oil produced overseas, this would have
no negative effect on the oil supply because other sources would be
available.12 6 Additionally, even transporting the oil home in times of disruption
could prove to be a major challenge. In the end, the IOC model suggests that oil
ownership does not assure oil supply.
On the other side, NOC model defenders argue that governments
should not trust market forces to ensure their oil supplies. "The crux of the
resource nationalist view is that a country can buy control or influence that
comes at the expense of another oil importer." 27 In times of disruption, IOCs
will give preference to their home country's supply, and this was the rationale
that initially motivated the incorporation of NOCs.128 In contrast, IOC model
122
Jennifer Lind & Daryl G. Press, The Strategic Case for Resource Nationalism 2 (Sept.
2011) (unpublished paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association)
(express
authorization
on
file
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author),
available
at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1900484.
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supporters would allege that (to some extent) the same argument could be
construed to apply to IOCs headquartered in a specific country: Washington,
for instance, could pressure Chevron or ExxonMobil for privileged
treatment.129 Nevertheless, NOC model advocates could answer by pointing out
that the multinational nature of the IOCs' interests naturally differs from the
interests of their home governments. IOCs' duties run towards their
shareholders, not national security. IOCs' discretion is bounded by the
agreements and deals they close worldwide. If the United States government
demands its major IOCs to sell the American government all of their oil in case
of an oil disruption, it would be asking them to breach their agreements with
their customers all over the world. It is unlikely these players would simply
yield to government demands for preferential treatment.130 This dynamic
became clear during the 1973 oil embargo, when Saudi Aramco (an American
IOC at the time) was obliged by the Saudis not only to fulfill, but also to police
the embargo against the United States.' 3 ' Fearful of losing its market share in
the Middle East, Saudi Amarco obeyed.13 2 It seems that the SPR 3 3 was the
response by the American government to this risk. In sum, this model supports
that "[i]n times of global supply shock, embargo, or blockade," "a strategy of
resource nationalism can confer real strategic benefit." 34
Given this brief overview of the two models, let us take a more detailed
look at the approaches adopted by Brazil and the United States.
3.

United States Versus Brazil

The United States has never had a NOC. The idea is seen as a nonmarket strategy policy,' 3 5 which clearly aligns the U.S. approach with the IOC
model. A 2007 report for Congress analyzing the role of NOCs in the

129
Empirical evidence of this influence was seen in Washington's response to China National
Offshore Oil Corporation's unsolicited bid to acquire Unocal for $18.5 billion in cash. See
Llewelyn Hughes & Sean J. Kreyling, UnderstandingResource Nationalism in the 21st Century,
J. OF ENERGY SEC. (July 26, 2010), available at http://www.ensec.org/index.
php?option=comcontent&view-article&id=253:resource-nationalism-in-the-21st-century&catid=
108:energysecuritycontent& Itemid=365.
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131
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international oil market examined the implications and consequences of
creating a United States NOC.13 6
In favor of the incorporation of a NOC, the report argues that a United
States NOC would act as a balance to offset other NOCs as well as to act in
cooperation with other NOCs. 1 This scenario would likely facilitate the
relation between the interests of the U.S. government and oil issues.
Additionally, a United States NOC would be less vulnerable to foreign
governmental coercions due to its public ties and would be more committed to
established energy policy goals. 8 Eventually, a United States NOC could
provide U.S. consumers with lower-cost petroleum products.19
However, the counter arguments to this idea tend to be much stronger.
IOCs are considered highly effective, in terms of efficiency and productivity, in
finding and developing new oil reserves. 140 "Their performance is especially
impressive in light of growing difficulties in gaining access to areas of the
world where potential discoveries may be made." 4 1 Studies show that NOCs
produce a significantly lower annual percentage of upstream reserves,
underperforming by between 21% and 30% when compared to their private
counterparts.14 2 The following conclusion is that ownership matters in the sense
that private ownership encourages better performance and greater efficiency
than state ownership does.14 3 These arguments have been persuasive in
explaining why the United States favors the IOC model. If the U.S. government
incorporated a NOC, it would send a signal that might weaken the position of
United States IOCs, a result unlikely to enhance U.S. energy security.144
Further, during periods of disruption, host governments may be more inclined
to expropriate or ban a United States NOC than an IOC.
Brazil, on the other hand, has a highly influential NOC, Petrobras. The
company was incorporated in 1953 as the outcome of the popular "the oil is
ours" campaign, with the goal of exploring Brazil's oil and gas, a public
monopoly at the time.145 Petrobras is now a publicly traded corporation
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controlled by the Brazilian government, present in twenty-eight countries,146
and the seventh biggest energy company in 2012 in the world1 4 7 with a market
cap of $124.7 billion. 14 8 It has activities in the sectors of exploration and
production, refining, oil and natural gas trade and transportation,
petrochemicals and derivatives, electric energy, biofuel and other renewable
energy source distribution. Petrobras 2012-2016 business plan calls for
investments in the order of $236.5 billion.14 9 Although Petrobras lost
exclusivity to develop oil and gas in Brazil in 1995 when the country raised the
monopoly restrictions and opened itself to other OCs to explore and produce
hydrocarbons, the recent introduction of the PSA regime forecasts a very
relevant role for Petrobras,o50 suggesting a reinforcement of Brazil's NOC
model.
In fact, Brazil follows a worldwide trend of ownership attributes.
Recent studies show that NOCs have increased ownership over strategic global
reserves from 72% in 2005 to 78% in 2008.15' The figure below shows the
changes in reserve ownership and proportional market value ("PMV") from
2005 to 2008 of NOCs, Foreign NOCs ("FNOCs"), integrated global
companies,15 2 and other companies. The PMV is the percentage of all the
companies' market values that belong to the company grouping. While NOC is
the only company grouping to increase reserve ownership, they also increased
their PMV by 78%.

146

Profile, BR PETROBRAS, http://www.petrobras.com.br/en/about-us/profile/ (last visited
Mar. 19, 2013) [hereinafter BRPETROBRAS].
147 2013 PFC Energy 50, PFC ENERGY, https://www.pfcenergy.com/PFC-Energy-50/PFCEnergy-50 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). In 2011, it was the fifth biggest, and in 2012 the seventh
biggest. Id. Petrobras's decrease is mostly due to losses accruing from public policy decision to
hold back gas prices to Brazilians. In short, Petrobras imports gas for a higher price (market
price) than it is sells in the local market (subsidized price). As a result of this policy, Petrobras's
common stock was worth its lowest price for the past seven years in February 2013. See
Petrobras ON Recua Para Menor Prego em 7 Anos, ECONOMico VALOR (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://www.valor.com.br/financas/2998444/petrobras-recua-para-menor-preco-em-7-anos.
148 2013 PFCEnergy 50, supranote 147.
149
Iso
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See supra Part II.A.3.

1 Gavin L. Kretzschmar et al., Abstract, The Ownership Advantage of Resource Hosting, 1
GLOBAL ECON. & FIN. JOURNAL (2009), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=1319494.
152 Gavin L. Kretzschmar et al., The Value of Strategic Resource Ownership-National
Winners & Major Losers 15 fig.2 (Jan. 2, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1322556. An integrated global company (also
known as oil major) is engaged in the upstream oil and gas sector, as well as at least one other
significant activity in the downstream sector. See id. at 8.
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The study assessed 4,078 oil fields across seventy-nine host countries
to demonstrate that NOCs have increased ownership at the expense of all
competitor groups and that the six giant oil majors (ExxonMobil, BP, Total,
Chevron, Eni, and ConocoPhillips) are the most affected as they compete for
similar assets.15 4 As IOCs are gradually losing space, the NOC dominance
looks set to redefine the sector. Nevertheless, since NOCs significantly
underperform the private sector in terms of output efficiency and profitability,
it seems that the preference for NOCs usually comes at an economic cost. 55
In the end, although Brazil adopted the NOC model whereas the United
States embraced the IOC model, both approaches provide pros and cons aligned
with each countries goals and historical context.
IV. CONCLUSION

This Article began by providing a comparative analysis between
American and Brazilian oil and gas exploration and production regimes.
Although both countries adopted similar frameworks regarding the granting of
oil and gas development rights, the government's take, and driller duties, they
have markedly different approaches to hydrocarbon ownership.
'51
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Brazil has a public ownership rule for in situ hydrocarbons and
different rules for extracted hydrocarbons, depending on if the applicable
regime is concession in which ownership will be transferred to the extractor or
PSA in which ownership is kept by the government even after extraction. In
this context, Brazil relies on a rather strong NOC, Petrobras, which under the
PSA regime has an even more relevant role as the sole operator with mandatory
30% participation in the pre-salt oil fields. This trend seems aligned to the
increasing shares of world reserves retained by NOCs although at a probable
economic cost due to the historical underperformance of NOCs compared to

IOCs.156
The United States, on the other hand, has private ownership of
hydrocarbons as a rule, consistent with the common law approach to property
rights. Consequently, American oil and gas development is based on the IOC
model and the free market view. Despite IOCs' proven better performances,
this model seems to be losing favor worldwide to the NOC model.
In the end, it is very hard to assess if any model should prevail over the
other. Whereas the NOC model clearly prevails from a reserve ownership
standpoint,'57 it is also subject to public policy decision that may compromise
its profitability. 58 Likewise, while the IOC model prioritizes performance, it is
not completely free from governmental interference.1 59 Each approach has its
upsides and downsides, and they seem to fit the historical context and legal
environment of each country.

156 This is merely an assumption based on the studies reviewed because there is no empirical
evidence of Petrobras's actual performance when compared to its IOCs peers.
15 See Gov'T OF BRAz., supra note 16, at 10.
'5
See 2013 PFCEnergy 50, supra note 147.
'5
See supra notes 119-120 and 129.
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